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ABSTRACT 
 
A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, 
so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern 
dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of 
rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that 
W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology 
and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work since laid out 
(e.g., in my recent articles) was unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a 
good job and nicely complements the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed. Budd’s summary is a fitting 
end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and 
designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of 
the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of such 
words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of 
introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate 
foundation.” 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full 
appreciation of W as I explain here and in my other reviews. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd 
ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
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OC 94 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
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of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and 
therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created 
and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical 
form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech 
acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and 
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intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be...In addition to these two 
faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not 
supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of cognition 
and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating commitment is abandoned 
and we have a propositional content without any commitment that it represent 
with either direction of fit." Searle MSW p15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"But there is no pre-linguistic analog for the Declarations. Pre-linguistic 
intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as 
already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions 
of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally 
produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents 
something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level it is a 
physical object like any other. At another level it has a meaning: it represents a 
type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true 
not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
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These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior from our two greatest descriptive 
psychologists. 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) 
and Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a 
New Century), TLP, PI, OC, WRTI and other books by these two geniuses. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
Among W's frequent topics in his 3rd period were the Inner and the Outer--see 
e.g., Johnston-`Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner' (WRTI) on how confusing 
the two is a major industry in philosophy and psychology) -- the impossibility 
of private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like 
`thinking', `seeing' first described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to 
be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of the inner resulting 
from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the 
brain. S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
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--Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- 
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joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to 
describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, 
make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle and Hacker (Human 
Nature)for good disquisitions on this). 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is 
the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we 
can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of 
which we mostly remain oblivious--called by S in PNC ` The Phenomenological 
Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless philosophical error but a universal 
obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we control our 
life and the consequences are almost certain collapse of civilization during the 
next 150 years. 
 
I find W's description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions 
in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S's (or anyone's). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive 
illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too 
are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more revealing 
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examples of language in action than anyone, one might say that his aggregate 
aphorisms illustrated by examples constitute the most comprehensive "theory" 
of behavior ever penned. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. I have had to cut 
the background info to a minimum, so those wishing for more please consult 
my many other reviews on W, S, Hutto, Johnston, etc. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional 
attitudes' by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: "Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that 
such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over pre-linguistic or 
proto-linguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able 
to convey very limited information about intentions. 
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Most will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 2" or 
DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S's taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for IAA "We have different levels of description where one level 
is constituted by the behavior at the lower level...in addition to the constitutive 
by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while those 
of IAA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) 
are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-
action(IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-
reflexive (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs 
and desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, which 
Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have 
created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological 
research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only vs propositional 
(dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, 
memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal 
(e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change 
the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on p 40 with 
"conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (`will') are 
9 
 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be 
with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination-
-desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- 
only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or 
blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the 
causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the 
past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. The two systems 
feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned 
deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions 
that dominate our life S has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
His summary of deontics (rights and obligations) on p50 of MSW needs 
translation. Thus "You have to have a pre-linguistic form of collective 
intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are built, and you have to have the 
collective intentionality of the conversation in order to make the commitment" 
is much clearer (once you get used to my terminology) as "The prelinguistic 
axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which 
evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in S3." 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A 
function is a cause that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status functions... 
require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of "The intentionality of language is created by 
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the intrinsic, or mind-independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) 
as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in 
mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
S states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has 
a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many 
times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and 
true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, 
axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional 
in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that 
was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must 
be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that 
always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no 
philosophy. 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations 
of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of 
billions and hundreds of millions of years of natural selections by inclusive 
fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-
linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' is in fact referring to 
EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for 
all behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous 
utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes of S1, while representations 
are the dispositional Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial 
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and indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement of how behavior works and 
hardly anyone has ever understood it. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified by the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology who thinks a bit can see that this view is not credible. 
 
Here is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason operates: 
We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce dispositions to 
behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve 
our inclusive fitness-IF (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those 
closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all 
unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we 
include the automated pre-linguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly 
the higher order DIRA of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require language are uniquely 
human. The paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 
acts and their S3 extension that are desire independent) is that the unconscious 
DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 
which often override the short term personal immediate desires. Agents do 
indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
On the contrary, following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic 
S1 true-only reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction 
as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page 
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as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states 
to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his 
“mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by 
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“cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only 
upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
I have adopted my terminology in this table. 
 
I give detailed explanations of the table in my other writings.  
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only an highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
Now for some comments on Budd's WPP. 
As with all commentary on W, one must keep in mind when it was written and 
what works were consulted. On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered 
collection of some 20,000 pages. Apart from the Tractatus, they were 
unpublished and largely unknown, although some were widely circulated and 
read (as were notes taken in his classes), leading to extensive but largely 
unacknowledged influences.  Some works are known to have been lost and 
many others W had destroyed.  Most of this Nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 
by Cornell University and copies were bought by a very few libraries. Budd, 
like most W commentators of the period, does not reference the microfilm. 
Although much of the Nachlass is repetitive and appears in some form in his 
subsequently published works (which are referenced by Budd), many variant 
texts are of great interest and there is substantial material that has never been 
translated from the original German nor published in book form. In 1998 the 
Bergen CD of the complete Nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text 
and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition  
 
$2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is available through interlibrary loan and free on 
the net as well. Like the other CDs of W’s work, it is available from Intelex 
(www.nlx.com). It is indexed and searchable and the prime W resource. 
However, my extensive readings of the W literature show that very few people 
have bothered to consult it and thus their works are lacking a critical element. 
One can see Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel for one notable 
exception. 
Note that in 2019 a new version of the brown book dictate by W to Francis 
Skinner will appear from Springer and early lecture notes take by Yorick 
Smithies have recently been published.  The searchable CDROM of his 
English books as well as that of the entire German nachlass, is now on 
several sites on the net and the Bergen CD is due for a new edition ca 2021-
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- http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). And of 
course, most academic articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and 
libgen.io. 
 
One major work dating from W’s middle period (1933) that was published as a 
book in 2000 is the famous Big Typescript. Since Budd finished this book in 
1989, neither this nor the Bergen CD was available to him and he neglected the 
Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by far the most important works date from 
W’s 3
rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all used by Budd. 
 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century 
Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, 
German, and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his works 
suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where 
one has to understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to 
translate. Since, in my view, nobody has grasped the full import of his later 
works, one can see why W has yet to be fully appreciated. Even the more or 
less well-known critical difference e.g., between understanding ‘Satz’ as 
‘sentence’ (i.e., an S1 utterance) vs ‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 utterance) in various 
contexts has never been fully understood (see my review of OC). 
 
The above comments seem to me to be as good a description of higher order 
behavior as one can find but of course it is not completely understood by 
anyone so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s to have grasped 
it. Like everyone he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to 
our EP and the whole framework of W’s and S’s work laid out above was 
unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a good job and nicely complements 
the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also 
reviewed. 
 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and 
the impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly 
(“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this 
argument are extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be 
public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no books and one day decide 
to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and 
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say ‘coconut’ again it seems like I have started on a language. But suppose what 
I say (since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even 
‘apple’ and the next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and 
we have great trouble keeping things straight even with constant correction 
from others and with incessant input from media. This may seem like a trivial 
point but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer— i.e., our 
true-only untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable 
statements regarding everything in the world, including our own behavior. 
Though W explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a century 
ago, it has rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any 
discussion of behavior unless one does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Johnston and 
others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity with Skinner, 
Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other behaviorist excretions that deny 
our inner life needs to go back to the beginning. 
 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, 
knowing, believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 
automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight. 
Thus, on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that 
is not a mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, understanding, 
believing etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32 and Moyal-Sharrock recently are rare exceptions) that 
W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into being) 
suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic processes in 
the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He 
also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end and this could 
mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace 
it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a 
certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions 
without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over a century 
now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” refer again 
to dispositions such as “may think it’s raining” which are possible states of 
affairs (or potential actions—S’s conditions of satisfaction) which may arise in 
chaos. It may be useful to tie this to S’s 3 gaps of intentionality which he finds 
critically necessary. 
 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is 
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anything that meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that there 
is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the 
imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is 
an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can be seen as another 
statement of his argument against private language (personal interpretations 
vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation on 
p36 -41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note here it is that many (most famously 
Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to 
community practice into thinking it’s just arbitrary public practice that 
underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times that 
such conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology which 
he often calls the background. Budd correctly rejects this as W’s idea several 
times (e.g., p58). 
 
In his next chapter, he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in modern 
psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and untestable 
background. His comment (p47)  ”that our beliefs about our present sensations 
rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the “myth of the given” is one of 
the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be misunderstood. 
Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these ‘beliefs’, but it is better 
to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. As W made very clear, the 
sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and not subject to 
belief in the usual sense but are better called understandings. Unlike our beliefs 
(including those in other people’s S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for 
doubt. Budd explains this well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no 
possible justification for saying one is in pain. That is, justifying means testing 
and that is possible with S2 dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 
reflexive fast unconscious processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is 
excellent but in my view, like everyone who discusses W on rules, private 
language and the inner, all he needs to do is say that in S1 there is no possible 
test and this is the meaning of W’s famous the ‘inner process’ stands in need of 
outward criteria’. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true only causal experiences of S1 and the 
reasoned dispositions of S2. 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, 
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thoughts etc.) is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the 
designation of dispositions to act, or in S’s terms, the specification of 
Conditions of Satisfaction which make the utterance true. 
 
 
Again, his discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that 
we ‘self-ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that 
we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-only 
and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different kind 
than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns reasons, 
and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out of the way 
of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets in right 
again — “So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain is 
compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be caused by 
a physical event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the pain he 
experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following statement that W would not 
accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, since in his later 
work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal 
automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back 
to S1 to cause muscle movements (including speech). Animals survive only 
because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around them which are 
highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly). 
 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how 
S1 and S2 interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean 
by ‘seeing’. In general, it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is part of the 
slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they 
are so well integrated that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple 
ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that W is exclusively 
interested in what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., 
aspectual or S2 higher order processing of images. 
 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of 
behavior, it is of great value to refer to Johnston’s book and especially to his 
discussions of the indeterminate nature of language. 
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In chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later work—the 
relations between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any 
have fully understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2, framework it is not 
surprising. Thus, Budd’s discussion of seeing (unconscious S1) vs visualizing 
(conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is severely hampered. Thus, one can 
understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination 
of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of there being no test for 
my inner experiences, so whatever comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s face 
is the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading and calculation which can refer to 
S1, S2 or a combination and there is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms 
to S1 processes where that lack of any test makes them inapplicable. On p120 
et seq. he mentions two of W’s famous examples used for combatting this 
temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and a tribe that had 
only S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) was not 
possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or potential acts—i.e., they 
are disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said 
before one really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and 
‘playing2’ etc. But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss 
‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until 
later. 
 
Hence W’s famous comment (p120)— “The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the 
speech itself is our thought and there is not some other prior mental process 
and this can be seen as another version of the private language argument for 
there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we 
thought before we act (speak). 
 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb 
‘intend’ is that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a 
potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I intend to 
eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t 
describe an intention but an action and if it meant saying the words (COS is 
speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it function in 
either case? 
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To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), 
we can say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth conditions. 
Hence the quote from W: ” When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going 
through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever 
I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely 
aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet” and “Like 
everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found 
in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can 
usually be translated as ‘EP’ and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy 
and higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
It helps greatly in this section on the harmony of thought with reality (i.e., of how 
dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it means to utter them) 
to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE (possible events) which make 
them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the COS (PE) which makes it true is 
that Jack arrives and my mental states or physical behavior (pacing the room, 
imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The harmony of thought and reality is that jack 
arrives regardless of my prior or subsequent behavior or any mental states I may 
have and Budd is confused or at least confusing when he states (p132 bottom) that 
there must be an internal description of a mental state that can agree with reality 
and that this is the content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted to the 
automatisms of S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The 
content (meaning) of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that 
he comes and not any inner mental event or state, which the private language 
argument shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. 
 
We have very clear verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’. 
And as W and S have beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of 
uttering the sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought that Jack will come 
and the COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so, the answer to the two 
questions on p133 and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should now be crystal 
clear — “In virtue of what is it true that my expectation does have that content?” 
and “What has become now of the hollow space and the corresponding solid?” as 
well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all 
point. 
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For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus, it should also 
be quite clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it “possible for there to be 
the required harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.” 
 
Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my image 
of Jack is an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the 
image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ if shown his picture 
and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the photo matches 
the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) to be an image of 
him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)” and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in “that’s Him” 
and “…what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies.” Hence 
W’s summation (p140) that “What it always comes to in the end is that without any 
further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … the 
question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. 
And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … Suppose 
it were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, 
then I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the COS 
and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc., have no bearing on the way 
dispositions function. 
 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be-- on the COS that I express. 
Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be expressed by 
reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there is less 
substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are the same—
i.e., they are causally self-referential—a concept further developed by S. If one looks 
at my table it is clear they have much more in common with the fast, true-only 
automatisms of S1 than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2 but of course S1 
feeds S2 and in turn is often fed by it. 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model 
of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the 
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picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of 
such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of 
introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” 
 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation 
of W as I have explained above and in my other reviews. 
 
